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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the concept of vulnerability as it relates to the materiality of systems, the 
exclusion of human physical corporeality, and social exclusion in Luhmann’s theory of social 
autopoiesis. We ask whether a concept of vulnerability can be included in autopoiesis in order to 
better conceptualise social exclusion and the excluded, with a view to understanding how, if at all, 
the dangers posed by this exclusion are mitigated by autopoietic processes. We are emphatically 
not returning to the human subject over operational systems, but seek instead to develop an 
understanding of the embodied nature of humans and their vulnerability within an autopoietic 
framework. We argue that the awareness of the risks to social functional differentiation posed by 
unmanaged exclusion – disenchantment, disassociation, and, most drastically, dedifferentiation – 
provided by our analysis indicates why hyper-exclusion must be mitigated. 
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Introduction 
In this text we explore humanism, embodiment and vulnerability in terms of autopoietic theory. We 
examine the exclusion of human physical corporeality and social exclusion in Niklas Luhmann’s 
theory of social autopoietic systems. Our ultimate goal is to explore whether the concept of 
vulnerability can be included in autopoiesis, thus reconceptualising corporeal and social exclusion 
and offering ways of better understanding the mechanisms of social marginalisation in, and the risks 
it poses to autopoiesis.  
In what follows we argue that the notion of social (hyper-)exclusion, that is exclusion from access 
to the operations of functionally differentiated autopoietic systems in toto (such as law, politics, 
economics and so on), and thus society, if left unmanaged and unmitigated poses a risk to one of 
the basic tenets of autopoiesis, namely the stable functioning of systems.1 Whereas Neves (2001) 
and Moeller (2006: 59-63) are principally concerned with those left behind by globalisation, 
‘peripheral societies’ (Neves 2001: 263), following Luhmann’s discussion in Beyond Barbarism (2008a) 
of Brazil’s favelas, we extend the discussion of under- and over-integration in Neves’ work (2001) 
to the context of societies thought to be “modern” and thus autopoietic. We argue that there is a 
need to acknowledge, if not the factual existence, then the certain risk, that under-integration (and 
implicitly over-integration) poses to function systems, and thus to autopoietic society. Individuals 
excluded by autopoiesis, because of the disassociation and disengagement from society that this 
entails are liable to seek alternative, non-functional means for resolving their difficulties. In the global 
                                                 
*We wish to thank Siobhan Weare for her helpful comments on, and discussion regarding this paper. We also wish to 
record our thanks to David Campbell, for acting as an intermediary to allow us to secure anonymous reviews, and to 
the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions. Any errors remain our own. 
1 We differentiate this form of (hyper-) social exclusion from ordinary exclusion (see ‘Exclusion as Erasure’ infra) 
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periphery, where autopoiesis has not developed, this has been termed the risk of ‘sabotage’ (Moeller 
2006: 59; Neves 2001: 264), in the context of autopoietic society however, such activity, where 
exclusion is not mitigated, may ultimately result in the dedifferentiation of function systems as 
individuals circumvent functional differentiation in search of a means to overcome their exclusion 
(consider Verschraegen 2002: 271). 
To demonstrate this we first address the current construction of humans generally, and socially 
excluded humans specifically, in autopoietic society with reference to universal values and universal 
human rights, which we find incapable of mitigating hyper-exclusion (contrast with Verschraegen 
2002: 262). From here, we turn to how autopoietic systems manage exclusion by erasing their 
awareness of it, that is, by invisibilising the excluded. Following this, we argue that, in order to 
manage the underlying risks associated with exclusion (disassociation and disengagement of human, 
psychic, systems from society, and ultimately dedifferentiation of function systems), autopoiesis 
needs a concept of the physical body. A concept of the body is necessary because it exposes the 
material existence of both psychic and social systems, and thereby their vulnerability to the 
consequences of social exclusion. In short, we ask whether autopoiesis, with its overwhelming focus 
on social systems, can accommodate the notions of embodiment and vulnerability in relation to 
exclusion in a way that allows the theory to remain consistent.  
The answer we reserve for this is a resounding yes, but not without some caveats. Thus, when we 
reference the body, we mean both the semantic construct of ‘body’ that all function systems possess 
as part of their idea of what a person is (for example, law’s legal person, see Naffine 2003; 2011; 
2012: 81-82, Naffine and Owens 1997: 7; and in autopoiesis Teubner 1993: 26; or also protections 
of the legal body, for example habeas corpus, or the treatment of bodies in medicine); and the body 
as physical embodiment, corporeality. We use the concept of the body to incorporate a notion of 
the factually undeniable physical embodiment of humans (see Bottomley 2002: 128; Fineman 2008-
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2009: f9, and in autopoiesis Halsall 2012; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2007), and their consequent 
vulnerability, as a means of bringing the concept of materiality to autopoiesis. 
In view of this, the autopoietic conceptualisation of embodiment and vulnerability informs our 
understanding of social exclusion in as much as they indicate that their practical use for overcoming 
exclusion is restricted by the ensuing awareness of the limits of social change. This, as we will explain, 
is due to the redundancy generated by the self-referential (negative feedback) loops that permeate 
social systems through, and indeed as part of, their own autopoiesis. While this does not sound very 
promising, it is a much-needed antidote to the flurry of rhetoric suggesting that social change 
happens causally, and is directly connected to human action; this necessity is most evident when 
viewed in contrast to discourses which imbue law with a profound transformative potential. 
Although human action does play a role, social change does not come about in the way current and 
even radical conceptualisations of the law advocate. Rather it requires an understanding of the limits 
of law’s capacity that are revealed through a systemic understanding of vulnerability. 
 
Non-humanism, anti-humanism, dehumanisation 
Let us begin with an exploration of the main autopoietic exclusion, which is that of humans from 
society. Exclusion in this sense means that the theory does not focus on humans and their actions, 
but on systems, such as law, politics, mass media and so on, all of which, taken together, comprise 
society. Autopoiesis reserves several counter-intuitive exclusions from its focus, but none more so, 
and more polemically debated, than the human exclusion.  
Autopoiesis is emphatically a non-humanist theory. It only observes systemic communications, not 
human actions. In the context of the theory, communications are not understood as human 
connections but as internal constructions of each system. Thus, the legal system constructs 
communications, such as legal argumentation, court decisions, statutes and so on, on the basis of its 
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systemic code (lawful/unlawful) which determines the boundaries of each system. The total sum of 
legal communications (namely whatever falls into either of the two values lawful/unlawful) is the legal 
system; anything else is the system’s environment, namely whatever the system is not. This can 
include other systemic communications (say, political, religious, economic and so on, according to 
the functional differentiation of the systems), as well as non-communications. Systemic 
communications are not communicated to other systems but remain within the legal system and form 
its operations. In other words, communications are neither human operations nor communicable 
to other systems. This counter-intuitive understanding of communication has further, equally 
counter-intuitive consequences.  
First, although humans form part of the process of production of communication, they are not the 
causal origin of such communications. Humans are not agents of actions within society, but conduits 
conveying meaning between and within systems as part of the communicative activity of society 
(King 2009: 79-82; Luhmann 1992b, p.411). When a judge decides on a case, she does so in her 
professional capacity. She will have other characteristics beyond her office, but, in terms of her 
decision, these parameters can only be accommodated to the extent that they can fit within the way 
the legal code is applied, how legal thought is structured, and the manner in which legal language is 
expressed (see also Blaschke, 2015, on autopoietic agency). Humans have two roles in autopoietic 
thinking: they are ‘semantic constructs’ and ‘independent autopoietic systems’ (Teubner 1993: 26). 
As constructs they are situated within the system as aspects of the system, such as in the case of 
the idea of the judge delivering judgment. As independent systems, they exist as people: the actual 
person of the judge. Both exist simultaneously and separately to one another, the ‘personal biases 
and subjectivity’ of the judge being translated into the language of the system (King 1993: 227-228). 
The same is true of the commercial lawyer acting within a court system and seeking to convince the 
judge; their personal biases and subjectivity can only be articulated and interpreted through the 
language of the system because the legal system interprets these communicative utterances through 
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its internal semantic construct (Nobles and Schiff 2013: 250-251). To approach the system otherwise 
is to risk being misunderstood, or to be made invisible and inaudible. 
The second and most drastic consequence of the communicational focus is that humans, as 
independent autopoietic systems, are excluded from social systems and society at large. It is clear 
from the above that the theory is not merely non-humanist but rather anti-humanist. As Moeller 
(2012: 21) puts it,  
‘[Luhmann] characterizes himself as a radical antihumanist because he thinks 
that the humanist self-description of society has been fundamentally flawed 
from the start. The world has never been human, and thus there has never 
been a shift from a human to a post-human world.’ 
Luhmann displaces the human not just from the centre, but also the greater focus of the theory, and 
replaces it with communications. Instead of communicating, humans perceive (a less exigent 
operation than communication because it does not depend on being selected and communicated, 
see Luhmann 1995: 412) and interact (a reciprocal perception of perception amongst human beings 
present to one another2). Both perception and interaction can become communication (Luhmann 
1994: 380). Social systems and humans are able to operate as environment to each other, while also 
maintaining their separation (Luhmann 1992c pp.75-76; see also Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010: 
111), thus triggering changes within the other system. As Luhmann (1997) suggests, communicating 
and perceiving/interacting are complemented by a third modality, that of living. Through the latter, 
the body puts in an appearance, albeit infrequent, in Luhmann’s writings. The connection between 
mind and body in Luhmann has been the subject of some debate in the literature (Bankowski 1996; 
Borch, 2011; Cesaratto, 2013; Halsall 2012; Paterson, 1996), and can be summarised as one of 
                                                 
2 A boundary of an interaction system is defined along the notion of presence: ‘they include everything that can be 
treated as present and are able, if need be, to decide who, among those who happen to be present, is to be treated as 
present and who not.’ Luhmann, 1995: 412 
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reciprocal autopoiesis, where one can irritate the other but not have unmediated access to it. Mind 
and body remain firmly excluded from society (consider Schütz 2009: 237-238). 
The theory’s anti-humanism should not surprise us. It is in line with (indeed predates) current anti- 
and post-humanist theories, such as new ontologies, posthumanist ethics, new materialisms and so 
on (see Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2014). Luhmann is unwilling to consider the human as a unity; 
he has “give[n] up the attempt to ‘singularize’ the human being” (Moeller 2006: 80; see also Halsall 
2012). In that sense, the argument to return to the subject, and to the human subject in particular 
in the way humanism and enlightenment theories envisage, has been rehearsed and found lacking 
(Grear 2007; 2014). Luhmann has rejected humanistic concepts of society as no longer satisfactory 
(1997: 31; see also Moeller 2008: 127). Autopoiesis has partly fulfilled its radical potential by resisting 
a world description given over to the facile causalities of human actions (Moeller, 2012). It describes 
the complex process of the production of reality, which so often takes place away from human 
control, without valorising the human. This is one of the hardest paradigm shifts initiated by 
autopoiesis, because it requires leaving behind “the fiction that played the role of the consolatory 
companion throughout many centuries of European Dasein” as Schütz (1996: 275) puts it. In 
autopoiesis, and in what is increasingly becoming our prevalent reality, human actions are deeply 
mediated by technological loops, financial opacity, political interests, legal complexity, and so on – 
all systemic operations through which human action is understood sociologically. 
 
Values 
The question, however, is whether autopoietic anti-humanism leads to dehumanisation, with 
potentially catastrophic social consequences, such as disengagement, disassociation and finally 
exclusion from every aspect of society.3 In this context, dehumanisation means that, at least at first 
                                                 
3 As it has become apparent, anti-humanism is a term of art for non-humanist theories and also theories that are against 
the humanism promoted by Enlightenment. Luhmann falls into this category. Therefore, while “anti-humanist” might 
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instance and from a legal-political perspective, values ordinarily thought of as integral to a modern 
democratic society (for example, justice, fairness, and equality) while not irrelevant, are demoted to 
internal constructions of systems, with their meaning to be determined by the systems’ binary codes 
(see Luhmann 2008b). One cannot attach such values to the operations of systems to modulate the 
working of the binary coding as in, for example, “just/unjust lawful”/ “just/unjust unlawful”. The 
autopoietic answer is unswerving: the meaning of such “third” values can only be understood in the 
context of, and through the operations of the systems in question (Luhmann 1992a, p147; Luhmann 
2008b, particularly pp.27-30; King and Thornhill 2003: 58; see also Neves 2001: 252-253 and Schütz 
2011: 193); they are meaningless outside this context (Moeller 2006: 116-117; Teubner 2009).4 
Indeed, to speak of a democratic, normative political society is to misunderstand the message of 
autopoiesis (King and Thornhill 2003: 63). These values do not offer a route through which the 
more comprehensive form of social exclusion, discussed earlier, can be conceived of and managed 
by autopoiesis (consider Teubner 2009: 8-9). As such, while we might naturally articulate a critique 
of destitution in a wealthy modern democracy in terms of social injustice or unfairness, this 
terminology seeks to express the failings of society using pan-social language that elides the 
specialised understandings that functional differentiation proposes. Autopoiesis indicates that only 
system specific conceptualisations of both the values and challenges which they are directed towards, 
can gain any traction (see Moeller 2006 on activism). 
The exclusion of the values upon which it is traditionally thought that society is constructed is not 
easy to accept, yet there is a plausible autopoietic explanation. In the context of a social system 
premised on identity-generating binary codes, the self-referentiality of that system is what allows 
society itself to carry on (Luhmann 1992a: 145-146; Teubner 1993: 15, 27). Placing importance on 
universal, and often moralising values, and giving them the status of trumps over the decisional 
                                                 
ordinarily be defined as against humans, and “dehumanised” as the absence of humans, for consistency with the existing 
discourse we have adopted what is, perhaps initially, counterintuitive terminology. See also Halsall (2012) 
4 Schütz (2007: 42), reflecting on the work of Bauman, takes this one stage further in stating that ‘A long list of claims, 
notions, and values, all of immemorial standing, including community, equality, solidarity, indeed “social behavior” …, 
are in the process of being made redundant, causally and unspectacularly.’ 
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independence and autonomy of functionally differentiated systems compromises the operation of 
those systems. Luhmann argues that we must disengage morality from systems, , leading to  what 
Schu ̈tz (1994: 158) calls ‘a source of anxiety among readers of Luhmann.’ In the context of the legal 
system, for example, the inclusion of moralising values would override systemic operations, resulting 
‘in the inflexibility of the legal system, [the] obstruction of its selective task, and would have, 
therefore, dysfunctional effects’ (Neves 2001: 253). Thus, it is not appropriate to seek to 
reincorporate universal values into autopoiesis in a manner which places them over functionally 
differentiated systems. In any event, the function of autopoiesis is not to create ‘a better society’ 
(King 2001: 5; see also Schütz 2009: 237), but to describe and articulate the communicative 
challenges which modern society faces. Whether or not we are disappointed in this conclusion, it is 
clear that third values cannot be of any assistance in preventing exclusion. Indeed, no concept is able 
to prevent exclusion. 
 
Rights 
A natural assumption, in the face of the failure if universal values, might be that universal human 
rights may offer some assistance (see Verschraegen 2002). However,one might consider that they 
fall into the same or a similar category as third values, attempting to act as an external prism through 
which systems should construct their understanding, and are, therefore, unhelpful to an 
understanding of autopoiesis that seeks to mitigate the risks of under-integration and disengagement. 
However, for Luhmann, universal human rights play a different role to that of third values in society: 
human rights are, paradoxically, the signifier for the exclusion of human beings from society 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010). Before the functional differentiation of modern society, one 
remained in the social position in which one was born, folding irreversibly into the hierarchical 
delimitation of one’s origin and, hence, one’s future (see Luhmann 2008b: 26; see also Moeller 2006: 
41-52; Verschraegen 2002: 261-262). In pre-modern society there could be no movement between 
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systems; this complete integration as a part of a fixed hierarchy amounted to a total or hyper-
inclusion (see Verschraegen 2002: 265-266). 
How, then, was the transition from a situation of total inclusion to specific, deliberate exclusion 
achieved? Functional differentiation broke up the inflexibility of pre-modern society, and human 
rights, particularly in the form of liberty and dignity, allowed humans to be reintegrated into a more 
fluid (though not equal!) society, where they could use rights as a vehicle to alter their social position 
(see Verschraegen 2002: 264-266): in other words, to move between functionally differentiated 
systems according to need (Luhmann 2008b: 26). Human rights became the grid on which humans 
could move and through which their access to various systems was secured. In the bright, new, 
functionally differentiated society, one has access simultaneously to the legal system, as legal subject; 
to the political system, as a citizen; to the economic system, as a bank account holder; and so on. In 
this sense, rights enable everyone to access systems, but it is up to the systems themselves whether 
or not, and on what terms, this access is granted (Luhmann 2004: 135). Consequently human rights 
present a somewhat different obstacle to the avoidance of exclusion than that of universalised third 
values: on the one hand there is a rhetorical exuberance that excludes no one, since rights are 
supposedly universal and inalienable (Verschraegen 2002: 268); and, at the same time, the factual 
(lived) experience of rights, the observation of which makes it painfully evident that not everyone is 
included. One needs to look only briefly at Fortress Europe to understand how, outside of certain 
parameters, modern society defaults to the old hyper-inclusion model of rights, that is, the absence 
of rights and the immobilisation of the individual (see, for example, Amnesty International 2014: 20, 
and the ‘misery’ of society noted by Schütz 2007: 42-43). Where society is placed under stress, and 
this will occur by degrees, the response is likely to begin targeting regressively those segments of 
society that are vulnerable by virtue of their under-integration. 
Rights only possess a qualified capacity for resistance against ordinary forms of exclusion in the face 
of the political rhetoric of expediency; that is, they anticipate the opportunity to access systems, 
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because it is their purpose to grant this, however, rights cannot, on their own, offer a means of 
guaranteeing the avoidance of hyper-exclusion (cf Verschraegen 2002: 262). When political entities 
are so willing to default to this more extensive exclusion (by force if necessary), and to turn to non-
functionally differentiated modes of operation as an effective (easy) solution, the mere “anticipation 
of opportunity” offered by rights is an insufficient countermeasure. 
The ordinary exclusion of the human is tangibly different from the more comprehensive hyper-
exclusion. The concept of ordinary exclusion is not an omission or an abstraction, but an overarching 
theoretical consideration: as Luhmann argues, it is only through excluding the thinking, living and 
acting presence of human beings from society that a sociological theory can “take human beings 
seriously.” (Luhmann, 2004: 84, n.19). According to Luhmann, humans are too complex and too 
unconstrained to be studied sociologically. Humans cannot operate within society (and its 
operations, its repeating communications, its Kafkian paradoxes, its systemic codes and boundaries). 
This is why Luhmann reserves for them the space outside society: in order for them to move freely 
and remain unpredictable. This can be contrasted with hyper-exclusion, where humans remain 
outside of the society of communications, and unpredictable, but lack the freedom of movement 
towards society, and in consequence may choose to look elsewhere for solutions to their 
unfreedom. 
Nevertheless, are humans to be left utterly out in the cold? Without the overarching concepts of 
justice, fairness and equality to direct the operations of society, and in the absence of the umbrella 
safety of human rights to embrace all human lives equally, autopoietic exclusion bites. Is there 
nothing we can do about it? Perhaps, but not by changing the theory to mitigate our discomfort with 
it. Autopoiesis is not, after all, a prescription for a better society but a description of society as it 
currently is. What is more, it is an immanent description, namely a description that reserves no 
outside, no better elsewhere (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2013). Everything that happens and 
everything that can happen can be found in here, in society and its exclusions. Even the hyper-
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excluded are conceptualised by society through their absence, and are, it seems, thereby abandoned. 
This immanence is so absolute that it becomes a Nietzschean affirmation (Cesarato 2013): not one 
that accepts society as it is, but one that confronts society with a clarity that armours one to carry 
on fighting in spite of a pervasive sense of anxiety borne out of the description offered. This is the 
value of autopoiesis, and this is how society can change. 
 
Exclusion as Erasure 
The horizontal, absolute and incontestable exclusion that has haunted autopoiesis must now be 
confronted. This is not, as we have said, the exclusion-as-necessary-condition to take the excluded 
seriously, but the exclusion as an absolute erasure, where neither third values nor human rights can 
operate, even in the latter’s qualified capacity as an enabling grid. This is the cumulative exclusion 
from function systems and from society as a whole, eradicated from autopoietic observation even 
as an indirect source of communication. Luhmann’s description (1997, 2008a; see also Neves 2001, 
Moeller 2006: 59-63) of the Brazilian favelas in the 1990s points precisely to such an exclusion, 
indeed a hyper-exclusion, where the excluded are not registered by any system. Yet, this hyper-
exclusion entered autopoietic description, which had seemed to ignore non-Western cultural 
contexts. Neves (2001) has pointed precisely to this discrepancy: in Brazil’s favelas, the rampant 
exclusion from society is so absolute and cumulative that autopoiesis bears no relation to 
experienced reality, and in particular to the humans that provide the social events that fuel 
communication (Neves 2001: 263). However, while Neves postulates that this experience manifests 
solely in so-called peripheral socieites, we contend that there is no reason why similar exclusion 
could not emerge in so-called Western, autopoietic society. 
Society produces exclusion through its normal functional operations (Moeller 2006: 61). In 
recognition of this, society makes some efforts to mitigate the ill-effects of exclusion through the 
welfare state (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010). However, there are limits to the compensatory 
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capacity of social security (Luhmann 1990: 22-23), and thus welfare represents only a nominal 
attempt at overcoming exclusion. Through its welfare operations, society converts its understanding 
of exclusion into a communicable event, which allows the communication about exclusion to be 
internalised, preventing further reflection because of its institutionalisation. Thus, we arrive at the 
uncomfortable conclusion that the welfare state society cares in order not to care (Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos 2010); compensatory mitigation cannot deal fully with social exclusion, just as human 
rights offer only qualified support. 
The limits of mitigation should be seen alongside Neves’ criticism of autopoiesis as being unable to 
describe social exclusion in “less developed” societies (an unsatisfactory label both in his and our 
eyes)5 (2001; see also Moeller 2006: 59-63). This argument rests on the observation that there exists 
a damaging combination of under- and over-integration into society, allowing hierarchical levels of 
access and concurrent levels of (dis)benefit. The under-integrated typically lack access to, for 
example, legal processes, whereas the over-integrated have the capacity to rise above and abuse 
those processes, and may act with ‘impunity’ (Neves 2001: 262). Moeller also develops this idea, 
observing that, in order to participate in the economy, to be able to buy and sell, one must have 
money, the functional inclusivity of the code of economy is not helpful (2006: 60). As with an inability 
to assert ones legal rights, a lack of money ‘easily leads to exclusion from other systems’ (Moeller 
2006: 61).  
As we have said, in the West exclusion is partly ameliorated by the welfare state (Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos 2010). However, the social system at large (namely society as the sum of social 
systemic communications) can only deal to and with that which it has the conceptual capacity to 
comprehend. Thus, the issues dealt with by welfare state are understood by the system against the 
backdrop of a construction of itself, situated in a particular temporal and spatial context, and against 
a unique history that shapes its responses to novelty (see also Schütz 2011: 190-191). In 
                                                 
5 For a critical exploration of the supposed universality and “goodness” of Western values see Schütz, 2011 
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consequence, the responses that such a system is able to make are limited, not just by its function, 
but by the situatedness and history against which those codes have come to understand themselves. 
This does not, however, prevent the possibility that more comprehensive exclusion may also be 
present for those whose needs the increasingly shrinking welfare state does not anticipate, and those 
whom systems choose not to address. Such exclusions variously deprive the individual of access to, 
for example, legal advice and advocacy, housing, personal security, food and water, employment, 
and political representation. Alternatively, though with the same consequences, individuals may 
suffer from ‘derivative’ deprivation brought about through their relationship to someone who has 
been denied access (Fineman 2014: 18-19), or due to illness (Fineman 2014: 20-21); it is to this 
construction that we address our critique. The presence of any of these deprivations, direct or 
derivative, is an indicator that the individual is under-integrated by society, and thus is either wholly 
or partially excluded, or at risk of exclusion; we argue that there is no reason why this cannot occur 
in “developed” societies. 
The risks inherent in an unmodified, Western-centric, autopoietic framework arise from the 
inequality of communicative opportunities it generates. That is, despite the presence of ostensibly 
mobilising human rights (Neves 2001: 262-263), there are those who are immobilised by virtue of 
their under-integration into a society which denies them access to, for example, the protection and 
processes of law (Neves 2001: 262; contrast with Verschraegen 2002: 262-263). Although not 
actually isolated, both because they are recognised (and ignored) by their absence from society, and 
also because complete isolation is almost impossible for most of humanity in an electronically 
connected world (Neves 2001: 261), they are nonetheless constrained and thereby excluded in 
practice from social systems (Neves 2001: 261-262). Law is one system which stands to be 
profoundly affected by this exclusion:  
‘… exclusion is expanded and intensified resulting in the releasing and generalising of destructive 
consequences which act against the validity of differentiating legal codes and against the 
constitution based on the rule of law and which represents the structural coupling of law and 
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politics. This is not about a mild meta-difference of inclusion and exclusion in Luhmann’s terms, 
which would mediate the codes of the functional systems and, thus, pervade a functional 
differentiation of society and the differentiation of law as well as the constitutional order, but 
rather about the generalised phenomena of exclusion that questions and threatens functional 
differentiation, the autonomy of law and constitutional normativity.’ (Neves 2001: 261) 
In a society where limitations are placed on the equality of opportunity to engage with functionally 
differentiated systems, the autopoiesis of society is partial. The parsing of autopoiesis exposes the 
vulnerability of the system and risks dedifferentiation: there is a disjuncture between the apparent 
accuracy of the operational description offered by autopoiesis, and the levels of autopoietic society 
that exist below these operations; the physical, the human. This is problematic because the system 
will be subjected to the sub-dermal pressure to dedifferentiate as those excluded from social 
processes look to other avenues for answers to their questions and the resolution of their difficulties 
(see also Verschraegen 2002: 271, 273); the vulnerable will seek the exposure of vulnerability. 
Such discussions as the above, in conjunction with Luhmann’s encountering the favelas, and Neves’ 
intense criticism of the autopoietic Western-centrism, are very important on the level of theory. 
Indeed, this is how protest enters autopoiesis: from within, yet breaking it apart.6 It is the 
visibilisation of the invisible: 
“… there are still immense differences between rich and poor, and such differences 
still affect lifestyle and access to social opportunities. What is different is that this 
is no longer the visible order, the order without which no order would be possible 
at all.” (Luhmann, 1997: 772)  
Functional differentiation promised an invisibilisation of social inequalities, but now the invisible has 
become visible (although still not instrumental for society, at least not in the way functional 
                                                 
6 Luhmann, 1989b, especially Chapter 18, and 1996. Luhmann systematically devalues the relevance of protest, both on 
account of its illusionary transcending quality, and its overproduction of societal resonance. Still, Moeller, 2006, suggests 
that, had Luhmann the possibility of revisiting the area, he may have come up with different conclusions. 
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differentiation is) and the hyper-excluded have become registered (see also Fineman 2014: 14). 
Society stands in ‘embarrassment’, on the one hand experiencing the ‘unmitigated indifference’ 
promoted by the inclusion/exclusion dynamic, yet on the other in ‘stunned silence’ (Schütz 2007: 
48). No longer limited to non-Western contexts, these invisible exclusions have come to shake the 
system from within, they are a protest against the visible order. This can only be a good thing. 
 
Bodies 
We have discussed above how autopoiesis deals with the human exclusion, both on the level of 
theory, as a condition for humans to be taken seriously, and on the level of social exclusion of 
humans from society, which on the level of theory is seen as the invisible hyper-exclusion. We now 
propose to examine the concept of embodiment in autopoiesis as a means of introducing the 
vulnerable corporeality of systems, which, in a way, finds itself at the core of the human exclusion 
issue. In an interesting article, Halsall (2012) envisages a way in which bodies could be part of 
autopoiesis: through their physicality, bodies irritate systems which, in their turn, modify their 
communications in order to accommodate such irritations. This is what Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos (2007) has called absent environment, namely the materiality of the systemic 
environment that irritates the system from the inside. While this still holds true, we aim at something 
more radical here: we are showing how, through the concept of vulnerability that emerges from the 
materiality continuum between systems and bodies, autopoiesis challenges itself and its various 
exclusions. 
For a theory with biological, material beginnings (Maturana and Varela, 1972 and 1992), Luhmann’s 
sociology is remarkably incorporeal. Both systems theory and autopoiesis have in their bases 
corporeal processes originating in cells, neurons, ecosystems and so on. Although Luhmann was 
selective in choosing what he needed from the various theories in order to integrate them into his 
own grand sociological theory, the exlusion of the material/corporeal is quite striking. It can be 
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understood, although not quite justified, if put in the context of its emergence: Luhmann proposed 
a sociological enlightenment on a scale that could not accept regional, cultural or personal variations. 
It had to appear solidly abstract and suitably universal in order to appeal to the various situations to 
which it was designed to apply. In consequence it is assumed that a proper consideration of 
corporeality would open the theory up to an ungeneralisable amount of variation. The body would 
upset the mind. 
A clear indication of such marginalisation of human embodiment in autopoiesis is the name that 
Luhmann reserves for humans: ‘psychic systems’. Autopoiesis implicitly conflates the concept of the 
“psychic” system with the idea of incorporeality, presumably because of the non-material 
commonality between psyche and mind. The particular construction of psychic perceptions and 
interactions as things that might at some point become systemic communication in a mind/society 
binary, and the elimination of the human as the object of sociological enquiry has led to the exclusion 
of the physical body as an object of inquiry, and with this the loss of its spatial and material context.  
For a vision of society that is in other respects so radically different from that which has preceded 
it, the falling back on the old mind/body distinction is problematic for autopoiesis. Indeed, it appears 
to echo positivism and objectivity, and a reliance on a construction of the human as the liberal 
subject. The corporeal exclusion has denied the theory access to a wealth of experiences and 
understandings accessible via the body, such as an examination of historically incorporated structural 
inequalities. In the absence of sociological tangibility of the body, it is easy to fall back on the 
interpretive structures, biases, and concepts of the past. This appears to have left autopoiesis behind 
those radical theoretical enterprises which have sought to supersede the old approaches, such as 
feminist legal studies, critical legal and socio-legal theory, new materialisms and so on. Autopoiesis 
needs the body (see Halsall, 2012). 
As a concept, and particularly as an aspect of legal theory, the body has been dealt with extensively 
by feminist legal theorists. While space does not permit a complete exploration of this rich 
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discourse, we must acknowledge the lessons for autopoiesis which can be gleaned from it. Feminist 
critique of law has exposed the notion of the body in legal thought and theory as essentially the male 
body (Naffine and Owens 1997: 12; Naffine 2011: 194-195). The legal theorist who transcends his 
body to avoid the limitations of the natural, achieving rationality and intellectual purity is inevitably 
found to be a masculine theorist (Smart 1989: 91). The principle reason why modernist theorists 
left the body behind, it is claimed, is because any association with the body as a concept integral to 
understanding social experiences ‘seems to cast doubt on the rationality and objectivity of the very 
mind of the theorist or social scientist’ (Smart 1989: 91; see also Bottomley 2002: 130-131). In this 
construction, the female represents the opposite of all that is thought of as central to scientific 
exploration, indeed it can be seen in binary terms (Smart 1989: 103). Ultimately, the traditional form 
of legal thinking seeks to render law’s construction of bodies genderless, while actually remaining 
masculine. This has allowed the concealment of vast absences in legal thinking because the female 
remains an unacknowledged absence in law (Smart 1989: 91-92); such an approach has also 
permitted hierarchical and discriminatory treatment, and indeed social exclusion on the basis of 
bodily characteristics that deviate from this norm (Fineman 2014: 21). The challenge for feminist 
legal theory has been to expose this absence, without provoking ingrained beliefs about the binary 
differences between male and female, or male and others (Smart 1989, p113; consider also 
Bottomley 2002: 114 and Naffine 2004), so as to recognise the experiences of men and women, and 
men and other categories we might draw upon, as different, and to highlight this difference as being 
important to legal thinking.  
By incorporating the body into law, the embodiment of individuals is recognised as having a direct 
bearing upon their lived experiences, and how they approach understanding (Bottomley 2002: 127-
128). It also obstructs the tendency to classify individuals with complex and diverse histories and 
needs into homogenous ‘at risk’ groups of, for example, ‘undocumented immigrants’ or the ‘poor’ 
(Fineman 2014: 16). This establishes multiple categories of person as active sites of meaning making, 
and prevents the law from being thought of as an all-encompassing, all-powerful (male) force, that 
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imprints its beliefs, structures, and decisions on an essentially passive (female) body (Bottomley 
2002: 132). Importantly, it requires that individuals be recognised as multifaceted, being neither 
simply (and put simply) female or male, immigrant or citizen, rich or poor, old or young (Fineman 
2014: 16). Reflecting on Deleuze, Bottomley argues that by reintroducing the body as a part of what 
it is to be a human experiencing society, the body comes to be recognised ‘as a site of multiplicity 
and potential’ (Bottomley 2002: 147). 
Therefore, in the absence of an explicit, corporeal and material inclusion of the body in autopoiesis, 
it can be said, in agreement with feminist legal theory, broadly construed, that the human (in his 
exclusion from the autopoietic legal system and society at large) is constructed as essentially male, 
taking his cue from a series of acts, precedents, conventions and so on that have been shown to 
have an essentially male history (albeit one asserted as objective, neutral, rational). That is, the 
semantic construct of the body that exists in law in the form of the legal person is male, and the 
lack of an awareness of the physical closes off the opportunity to recognise the inaccuracy of this 
patriarchally-inspired construct and so confront it (Naffine 2011: 203; see also Weinbach 2013 on 
gendering autopoiesis to show gender as a form of control mechanism for systems); furthermore, 
such a construct may not be habitable in reality (Mauthe and Firth 2013: 473). The work of feminist 
legal scholars indicates that an absence of consideration of the body in law leads to inaccuracies that 
in turn create inequalities of treatment and access.7 This realisation may lead to the exposure of 
further such inequalities of treatment beyond the female; for example, in relation to physical 
vulnerability of the body, given that the body of the male is normally portrayed as ‘clearly delineated’ 
and ‘impermeable’ (Naffine and Owens 1997: 12). 
Is this, however, equal to an autopoietic opening to materiality? An autopoiesis with an 
underdeveloped concept of the physical body lacks the richness of experience that the body, as a 
site of ‘potential’ that is ‘(always) in the process of becoming’ (Bottomley 2002, 140), may offer. This 
                                                 
7 Others have suggested that the narrower concept of personhood might also be effective Mauthe and Firth 2013 
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is not, as we have already said, a call to return to the subject, or to place human action at the centre 
of things. It is instead a call for the development of the concept of the autopoietic body, in order to 
accommodate a wider range of perceptual and interactive experiences as legitimate experiences 
that can figure coherently in communication. If at present the legal system operates in such a way 
as to exclude meaning coming from corporeality, then the inclusion of the latter will allow the legal 
system to recognise some of the limitations of its present boundaries, and to reassess what it has 
previously (hyper-)excluded as noise (consider Smart 1989: 11 on the classification of certain aspects 
of the human experience as consisting of non-legal knowledge). Corporeality in autopoiesis would 
narrowly although inexorably open the theory to the observation of the hitherto invisible and 
unobservable: the acknowledgement of an outside – what William Rasch (2000a: 119; see also Rasch 
2000b: 210) calls ‘the Spasm of the Limits’. 
Luhmann was not indifferent to spasms. Indeed, he took them seriously, as his description of the 
favelas reveals: ‘existences reduced to the bodily … attempting to get to the next day’ (2008a: 20; 
see also Moeller 2006: 62), and ‘physical violence, sexuality, the elemental and impulsive satisfaction 
of necessities’ and ‘the observation of bodies’ (1997: 633). In these later works, an understanding of 
embodiment from within autopoiesis is sketched. It does not, however, point to well-integrated, 
well-behaving, normalised bodies whose movement and pause could become, at some point, part of 
systemic communication. Rather, a different sort of body emerges, hitherto excluded, invisible, but 
also noisy, fragile, exposed: in other words, vulnerable. It is here that the concept of vulnerability can 
be seen as key to understanding the autopoietic body, and ultimately as a means of mitigating the 
risks of hyper-exclusion. 
 
Vulnerability 
Vulnerability, as articulated by Fineman (2008-2009, 2012, 2014), has already appeared as a key 
concept across several areas of legal thought (see for example, FitzGerald 2010; Sherwood-Johnson 
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2013; Grear 2011 and 2014; Fineman and Grear 2014; and Stychin 2012). In its habitual 
understanding, vulnerability clashes with autopoiesis: ‘vulnerability is – and should be understood to 
be – universal and constant, inherent in the human condition’ (Fineman, 2008-2009: 1).8 Yet, as will 
become clear, there is also a close alignment between autopoiesis and Fineman’s vulnerability 
because ‘dependency and vulnerability are not deviant, but natural and inevitable’ (2014: 17). 
Vulnerability is an intrinsic consequence of the material commonality between systems and bodies, 
as we shall see below. To start with, the factual accuracy of the statement that everything is exposed 
to ‘the ever-present possibility that our needs and circumstances will change’ is inescapable (Fineman 
2008-2009: 12, see also pp.8-9; 2012: 71, 86). Vulnerability appears to be universal in the same way 
as the concepts underlying human rights; liberty and dignity.9 Indeed perhaps more so, as neither 
systems nor humans are invulnerable to the changing of conditions nor the entropy of natural 
processes, or artificial decay. This does not make it a universal concept in the same way as third 
values or rights. Rather, we suggest that vulnerability aligns with the self-preserving operations of 
autopoiesis itself in a way that needs to be consistently invisibilised. 
Vulnerability exposes the violence of the inequality which flows from both isolated and cumulative 
hyper-exclusion from society (consider also Fineman 2014: 24), namely from individual systems and 
society respectively. The liberal version of the equality/inequality discourse seeks balance through 
the formally equal treatment of individuals (Fineman 2014: 14-16; see also Verschraegen 2002: 274-
275). On this view, unless unequal treatment of an individual is attached to an aspect of a specific 
operation of the system, the systemic element of inequality is not addressed (Fineman 2008-2009: 
4). Inequality which flows from outside of the control of the system is not part of the system’s 
inclusion/exclusion decision; that someone cannot afford to access the legal system in order to have 
                                                 
8 Note the divergence between Fineman (2008-2009, 2012, 2014) and autopoiesis in that Fineman places human agency 
at the centre of her model for overcoming the inequalities perpetuated by the concept of the ‘liberal’ rather than the 
‘vulnerable’ subject (see Fineman 2008-2009: 13). 
9 At the same time, as with the concept of the body, vulnerability can also exist as a differently understood semantic 
construct within systems – which may manifest in, as King has observed (1991) serious difficulties in relation to 
vulnerable persons, such as children. 
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the opportunity to be subjected to law’s inclusion/exclusion decision is not a concern of formalistic 
equality measures undertaken by law; it is not within the system. Furthermore, because ‘inequalities 
are produced and reproduced by society’ (Fineman 2008-2009: 5), it may appear that such structural 
inequalities are inevitable. However, these inequalities are ‘certainly not natural’ (Fineman 2008-09: 
5), they are not the inevitable result of societal interaction, but instead are the historical 
consequence of a particular, and in the case of autopoiesis unquestioned, direction of societal 
development (Fineman 2014: 17); vulnerability may be inevitable, but specific inequalities are not. 
Despite the impression that autopoiesis may be unnecessarily not just mirroring but perpetuating 
structural inequalities, it is clear that neither law nor any other system has the ability to change or 
eradicate social inequalities (consider Fineman, 2008-2009: 5); nor can one seriously advocate the 
idea of all-inclusion.10 What should instead be drawn out from this understanding of inequality is that 
the individual experience of vulnerability always exists, in a particularised and personal way, within 
a wider network of systemic inequalities and imbalances (Fineman 2008-2009: 10). Not everybody 
is able, or indeed enabled, to engage equally well with society, either in the playing of particular roles 
(for example, employee, parent, citizen), or through interaction with other psychic systems (such as 
lawyers and doctors). This is largely because of the variable ability of humans to emulate the liberal 
subject (2008-2009: 11; 2012: 84; 2014: 14). Humans are not, therefore, afforded equality of 
opportunity to engage with systems, even if those systems should then reject their efforts as 
irrelevant or misconceived (the feminist critique of law’s deafness, why it chooses to reject, should 
not be forgotten, but space does not permit an exploration of this here, see further Smart 1989). 
This form of inequality bears a close resemblance to the problems Neves indicated in relation to 
over- and under-integration (2001: 261-263). It recognises that although the inequalities brought 
about by the exposure of one’s vulnerability might be confined to each system (for example, a lack 
of access to legal advice, a lack of employment), their effect is cumulative, and the resulting exclusion 
                                                 
10 Fineman herself recognises the impossibility of all-inclusion, albeit using different terms, speaking of the possibility of 
lessening vulnerability, rather than eradication of vulnerability, 2008-2009: 10 
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total. In the same way as the denial of fundamental human rights prevents access to, movement 
within and between systems, an under-integrated individual, where their vulnerability is exposed, is 
also ejected from, or never permitted in the first place to approach, the social system. The problem 
of under-integration is, therefore, not to be seen as unique to ‘peripheral societies’ of limited 
functional differentiation, but as a risk to all societies (contra Neves 2001: 263). The vulnerability of 
the embodied human demonstrates that we are all at risk of losing access to social communication, 
as the recent European Union financial and social crises have demonstrated beyond doubt. 
 
Materiality Continuum 
The above makes vulnerability an ontological constant of autopoiesis without, however, making it a 
universal one.11 The operation of vulnerability emerges from a concept only occasionally employed 
by Luhmann that underlines (ontologically, we would say) all autopoietic operations: the materiality 
continuum. Luhmann writes:  
“…the establishment and maintenance of system boundaries – including those of 
living beings – presuppose a materiality continuum that neither knows nor respects 
those boundaries”. (1997: 54) 
The continuum brings together (while separating) all three modalities; the social (communication), 
the psychic (interaction and perception), and the corporeal. At the same time, however, and this is 
one of the greatest autopoietic paradoxes, the materiality continuum must be excluded from 
autopoietic considerations: 
                                                 
11 Ontology is not prima facie compatible with autopoiesis, which claims to be radically epistemological; see however 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2013; Rasch, 2013. 
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‘… whenever there is an emergent order, we find that the elements of a 
presupposed materiality- or energy-continuum are excluded. Total exclusion is the 
condition of emergence’ (1992d: 1441) 
A materiality continuum is presupposed, yet necessarily excluded by each modality in an attempt to 
establish and maintain its autopoiesis. In that sense, humans, animals, objects, ideas, and indeed 
systems, are all embodied in this continuum; but its omnipresence must be excluded for the sake of 
the emergent order of autopoiesis (this can be contrasted with Actor-Network Theory, see Mauthe 
and Webb 2013). And just as one can talk about vulnerable human bodies, or indeed fragile things 
(Connolly, 2013), in the same way one can talk about vulnerable (or fragile) systems (see 
Verschraegen 2002: 271). The very need to invisibilise the materiality continuum that brings all 
operations together, exposes systems to the vulnerability of a constant battle of differentiation 
against dedifferentiation. The foundational gesture of autopoiesis, the line that separates a system 
from its environment, is in itself a defensive mechanism, and in turn a clear indication of systemic 
vulnerability. The reason for the relative closure of autopoiesis rests in an acknowledgement of the 
risk, perhaps even the fear of melting away among the velocity of the continuum. This is the 
autopoietic meaning of vulnerability in its most foundational sense: to be thrown into material 
continuum, trying to keep oneself together while battling against the irresistible dissolution of the 
outside (see further Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2011).  
Vulnerability is thus a material and embodied concept, the meaning of which becomes evident when 
seen in relation to materiality continuum. This is also the reason for which it can be accommodated 
in autopoietic thinking. As with materiality continuum, vulnerability brings together social systems, 
psychic systems and matter, and opens up new communicative possibilities at the functional and 
psychic levels of society. As with materiality continuum, vulnerability must be internalised in each 
system, and each body, in order to emerge’ namely to establish and continue autopoiesis. Finally, 
vulnerability goes to the core of each system and each body, yet it must be put aside, kept excluded. 
Consider the risk of systemic dedifferentiation: the destabilisation of specialised systems of 
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operation due to novelty, catastrophe, or simple inadequacy. Dedifferentiation, which may manifest 
in the falling-back on the use of arbitrary force to resolve political disagreement, political expediency 
to counteract legal impasse, or economic corruptibility across other function systems, destabilises 
the ordinary reproductive workings of function systems by ignoring and circumventing them (see 
also Verschraegen 2002: 273-274). It is for this reason that Luhmann (2004) urges against 
dedifferentiation. Consequently, differentiation has become the autopoietic fetish par excellence 
(what Schütz (1994) calls Luhmann’s cryptonormativities). The fear, or realisation of, for example, 
politics or law being taken over by a system such as economy or religion, thereby becoming 
dedifferentiated, would signal, for Luhmann, the end of modernity. Regardless of the fact that this 
might indeed already be happening in some way or other (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010), the 
point of interest here is that the command “do not dedifferentiate” resonates with this other 
command: “hide your vulnerability”. Do not allow the outside to come in and alter you. Systemic 
identity is a fragile, volatile, constructed thing, characterised by vulnerability through and through. 
But indulging this vulnerability does not help autopoiesis. 
 
Autopoietic Vulnerability and Hyper-Exclusion 
Can this kind of autopoietic vulnerability help the hyper-excluded human? It is very doubtful that on 
a practical level it could have a direct effect. As we have said, no concept as such can change social 
conditions, even human rights only open up the possibility of movement within society. What human 
rights and vulnerability do, however, is allow individual identification, encourage awareness of needs 
and lacks, and help mobilise towards their realisation. In this sense, autopoietic vulnerability can 
help. First, it intervenes in the vulnerability discussion with a pragmatic, measured approach. By first 
alerting us to the need for a concept of the physical body in autopoiesis, and then extending 
vulnerability to bodies and systems alike, one understands that all involved are equally burdened by 
the need to deal with vulnerability: by excluding it from awareness/communication (this is not the 
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‘burying’ of the dependency of the vulnerable within private life referred to by Fineman 2014: 18). 
This, of course, always leads to more vulnerability because it cuts off avenues of solidarity and 
collective action in terms of human bodies, or more adventurous, deeper structural couplings 
between systems. Hiding vulnerability is itself an act that exposes more vulnerability. And this 
vulnerability autopoietically reproduces itself, locked up in isolated instances of systemic and 
corporeal closure. 
This understanding of vulnerability seeks to manage the resultant underlying pressure to 
dedifferentiate as a means of finding a better mitigation for  hyper-exclusion, by counselling against 
the wider risks to society that following this path would entail (autocratic populist dictatorships 
having already harmed both individuals and systems in this way, see Verschraegen 2002: 271). In this 
sense, there is some autopoietic truth to Fineman’s argument that ‘our vulnerability and the need 
for connection and care it generates are what make us reach out and form society’ (Fineman 2014: 
22). The communicative exclusion of vulnerability is thus not the same as its suppression; the threat 
of dedifferentiation means that, even in its absence, it remains ever-present and cannot be ignored, 
it demands that systems actively seek the means to increase access to avoid the risk of vulnerability 
exposure. 
Second, it shows the limits of the potential of systems and human bodies alike, especially in relation 
to each other. The liberal idea of all-inclusion (based, of course, on one’s assumed ability to be part 
of the system, see further Fineman 2014: 14-16) is undermined through the above approach. But 
even the equivalent critical utopia of all-inclusion, this time not on the (neo)liberal understanding of 
‘personal potential’, but in terms of the more socially aware expansion of the welfare state, 
international aid, regional solidarity and so on, is itself shown to be exposed to the vulnerability that 
comes from the inability of systems to dedifferentiate as a solution to exclusion (and therefore 
expose their vulnerable identity to the materiality continuum). This points to a measured 
understanding of how much effect human action can have, whether in terms of its everyday 
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mobilisation, or in terms of more radical interventions such as protest, revolt or revolution. We 
have witnessed all of these in the last decade or so, in varying contexts that spread from Cairo’s 
Tahrir Square to Athens’ Syntagma Square and London’s St Paul’s. We have also witnessed how slowly, 
indeed if at all, systemic operations have registered these, and what kind of innovation they initiated 
(or indeed how much redundancy won the day). Change does not come in a causally determined or 
even traceable way. Change of that magnitude requires a sustained, multi-lateral, and causally 
complex persistence, which society itself (in the sense of function systems) resists. 
What we can recognise however, is that legal thinking is finally turning spatial, corporeal, material. 
With it, so does legal autopoiesis, and autopoietic thinking at large. Autopoiesis is a theory with 
immense potential, both because of its ability to describe society in a counter-intuitive yet actual 
way, but also because it shows clearly the limited expectations that one can have of systems and 
their communications. Introducing corporeality and vulnerability to autopoiesis brings to the theory 
the kind of spasms which allow it to develop further by opening up communicative possibilities that 
demand answers, structural reflection, and novel communication. 
Conclusion 
In expanding Luhmann’s previously underdeveloped thinking on corporeality, we have demonstrated 
that autopoietic and psychic (human) systems are exposed to the shearing forces of the materiality 
continuum because of their physical embodiment. In so doing, we have shown that the vulnerability 
disclosed by a recognition of materiality is a vital concept for autopoiesis, particularly when the 
autopoietic description of society offers a picture of increasing tension and strife. This confirms and 
builds upon Neves’ observation by explaining not only that the under- and over-integration of 
individuals towards function systems is problematic for “peripheral” societies, but also that it poses 
significant risks to what are traditionally conceived of stable autopoietic social systems. In view of 
this we have explained that, while autopoiesis may be able to successfuly invisibilise the excluded 
(both hyper- and ordinary), the failure to remain aware of the existence of that absence at all times 
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exposes society to the risks of disassociation, disengagement and, most radically, dedifferentiation, 
for the simple reason that the excluded seek alternative means, outside society, to register their 
exclusion. 
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